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ABSTRACT: Practical arguments for actions are arguments which, besides their epistemic function, 
shall motivate an addressee to execute the justified action. First, a strategy is developed how this 
motivational and other requirements can be met. Part of this strategy is to identify a thesis for which 
holds that believing it motivates in the required manner. Second, relying on empirical decision 
theory, such a thesis is identified. Finally, precise validity criteria for the respective arguments are 
developed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE AIM OF THIS PAPER 
 
The main aim of this paper is to develop a conception of good practical arguments 
for prudential justifications of actions – where ‘prudential’ here is understood as, 
different from and sometimes in opposition to ‘moral’, regarding the best interest of 
a given person. And the terms ‘practical argument’ or ‘practical justification’ can be 
defined provisionally as: argument or justification sustaining a proposal to execute 
or realise the justified object, i.e. the action. The theoretical approach chosen here to 
develop this conception is the epistemological approach to argumentation, which 
holds that the standard function of argumentation is to bring about an addressee's 
justified belief (i.e. cognition or knowledge in a weak sense) in the argument's thesis 
by guiding his cognising the thesis.1 In addition, the method chosen is not to 
immediately systematise everyday argumentation but to take a rather theoretical 
route in asking first what a practical argument shall achieve. 
 
2. THE PROBLEM OF PRACTICAL JUSTIFICATIONS AND A STRATEGY TO 
OVERCOME IT – THE PRACTICAL JUSTIFICATORY THESIS 
 
                                                        
1 The epistemological approach to argumentation is advanced e.g. by John Biro, Richard Feldman, 
James Freeman, Alvin Goldman, Christoph Lumer, Harvey Siegel, Mark Weinstein. For an overview 
see: Lumer, 2005b. 
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So, the aim of this contribution is to develop a conception of practical justifications 
of objects like actions, rules, norms, instruments; and the approach on the basis of 
which this is done is the epistemological approach to argumentation. However, it is 
precisely the epistemological approach which seems to lead to considerable 
problems with respect to practical arguments. First, if according to the 
epistemological approach to argumentation the standard aim of argumentation is to 
bring about justified belief and if, as is usually held and is also held by the 
epistemological approach, a belief's content is a proposition so that the claim of an 
argument is again a proposition, or more precisely: the judgment that a certain 
proposition is true, then actions can be neither the direct object or the claim of an 
argument nor the direct standard output of argumentation. The claim can only be a 
judgment about a proposition, and the direct standard output can only be a 
(hopefully justified) belief. The second problem of an epistemological approach to 
practical arguments is that leading to a new justified belief is characteristic of 
theoretical arguments but it is not sufficient for a good practical argument or a 
practical justification. Good and successful practical arguments are also motivating: 
if the addressee of the practical argument is identical to the subject of the action to 
be justified, then this addressee, after having accepted the argument cognitively, is 
also motivated to execute this action.  
The problem just sketched is further broadened by the fact that beyond 
actions there are still other objects of practical justifications which are not 
judgments either. Among the things we can practically justify are instruments, 
definitions, motions, morals, norms, conceptions of rationality or of science, 
empirical theories etc. Even for these objects it holds that the practical justification 
should not only lead to new cognitions about them but also to a practical kind of 
acceptance of them, i.e. to a certain kind of motivation with respect to these objects. 
The easiest and clearest way to put the theoretical, epistemic and the 
practical, motivational aspects together and to fulfil both kinds of requirements is to 
reduce practical arguments to special kinds of epistemic (“theoretical”) arguments:2 
A practical justification of or a practical argument for some x (where x is not a 
judgment or a belief) is an epistemic argument for a certain thesis about x, which is 
called the ‘justificatory thesis’; this justificatory thesis then has to satisfy certain 
conditions, in particular, believing in this thesis (under certain conditions) must 
lead to the required motivation with respect to x. This strategy for conceptualising 
practical justifications and arguments neatly separates questions of truth and 
questions of relevance. Epistemic and alethic requirements of truth are fulfilled if 
the practical argument is a valid, sound and situationally adequate argument for a 
certain thesis; the standards for this component can be developed analogously to 
those for other epistemic types of arguments. Requirements of relevance and 
motivation instead are fulfilled by the fact that the argument justifies a very specific 
thesis, namely the justificatory thesis. 
 
                                                        
2 The strategy and the adequacy conditions set out the following have been elaborated in more detail 
in: Lumer, 2009, pp. 241-350. An abbreviated exposition of the conception of practical justification is: 
Lumer, 2010, pp. 151-154. 
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3. ADEQUACY CONDITIONS FOR THE JUSTIFICATORY THESIS 
 
The first principal task in executing the just sketched strategy is to determine the 
justificatory thesis. This is a difficult and decisive part of the research, and has to be 
developed with much care. In order to blurt out an ad hoc proposal it is helpful to 
proceed in a somewhat indirect way: First, I will postulate and motivate some 
adequacy conditions for such a justificatory thesis; in the second step, I will work 
out a justificatory thesis which fulfils these adequacy conditions. 
 
AC1 Adequacy Condition 1: reference to the object: A minimal requirement 
of relevance for a justificatory thesis is that it is a thesis about the 
object of justification.  
 
Otherwise, we could not say that the argument for this thesis is also a justification of 
the object in question. Hence in the following we have to search only for the 
justificatory predicate (in the logical sense of: a radical of a proposition) of the 
justificatory thesis. The justificatory predicate also represents a criterion of quality 
for the object of justification. 
 
AC2 Adequacy Condition 2: motivation: Justificatory theses are motivating 
in the sense that if a prudent addressee (i.e. an epistemically and 
practically rational addressee with certain relevant information) is 
convinced of the justificatory thesis he is motivated, at least to a 
certain degree, to perform the above (section 2) mentioned action 
with respect to the object of justification. For other objects the 
motivation requirement is weaker. In case e.g. of a moral norm the 
addressee must have only an initial motivation to follow the norm, 
which, however, can be overruled by stronger opposite motives.  
 
Some reasons for the motivation requirement are: 1. The motivation 
requirement is the specifically practical component of the conception of practical 
justification. Practical justifications must go beyond mere epistemic justifications by 
having a certain influence on this practice; they must lead to a practical acceptance 
of the object of justification. A practical justification would have failed if it had no 
further influence, if e.g. the addressee were to ask: ‘Okay, now I know that the thesis 
about this object of justification is true; but so what? Why should this be relevant or 
important?’. ‘Practical acceptance’ of the object of justification can only be 
explicated in terms of motivation for certain actions. 2. Fulfilling the motivation 
requirement ensures the relevance of the insight. After all, we can have an infinite 
number of insights about any object of a justification. The large majority of them 
would be so arbitrary and irrelevant that we would not even know why the fact 
stated in them should be a reason for the object of justification. Relevance is 
constituted, however by establishing some relation to our motives. 3. Pragmatically, 
a practical justification fulfilling the motivation requirement has the advantage of 
really bringing about something. The pure pragmatist does not need to claim that 
other types of practical justifications which do not fulfil this condition are false, or 
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invalid or something like that; he can simply leave such “justifications” to 
themselves and bet on their lack of influence. – Fulfilling the motivation 
requirement presupposes a strong theory of action, which informs us about how 
which kind of convictions can affect our motivation. 
 
AC3 Adequacy Condition 3: stability of the motivation effect against new 
information: The motivational effect of a justified conviction of the 
justificatory thesis is not infringed upon by acquiring new true 
information. This means, there is no true information for which holds: 
if the respective person had this information she would continue to 
believe in the justificatory thesis, but this belief would no longer 
motivate in the way required by AC2. 
 
The point of this adequacy condition is not the stability (against new information) of 
the belief in the justificatory thesis itself but the stability of its motivational effect. 
Since a good and valid practical justification may be only defeasible, sometimes it 
will happen that some new and true information makes the addressee revise his 
belief in the justificatory thesis; this is no wonder and no objection to taking the 
thesis' predicate as the justificatory predicate. What may not happen though, 
according to stability condition AC3, is that the new information leaves the 
conviction of the justificatory thesis intact but erases its motivational effect because 
the addressee has changed his decision criterion because of that new information. 
Some reasons in favour of the condition of motivational stability are these: 1. 
Stability against new information is the rational component of the conception of 
practical justification. The requirement of stability against new information 
introduces the practically relevant maximum of epistemic rationality into the 
conception of practical justification, namely that when practically accepting the 
object of justification all true and relevant convictions have been taken into account. 
2. Stability with respect to new information prevents the practical justifications 
from being persuasive in a pejorative sense. It introduces some sort of wisdom, 
wisdom in the sense of transcending singular knowledge towards a more 
comprehensive knowledge about nexuses and the fundamental questions of life. 3. 
Stability with respect to new information contributes to the long-term duration of 
the motivational effect.  
For reasons of space I leave out the adequacy conditions for justifying other 
objects than actions. 
To further develop the theory of practical justifications of actions, we  now 
need a strong philosophy of action, or more precisely, a strong cognitive psychology 
of decisions, which can tell us by which kind of convictions people can be stably 
motivated to act in a certain way 
 
4. SOME ESSENTIALS OF COGNITIVE DECISION PSYCHOLOGY 3 
                                                        
3 Parts of the following decision psychology have been elaborated in full in different publications: 
Most of the psychological laws and the parts on intrinsic valuations in: Lumer, 2009, pp. 128-240; 
428-521; the theory of intention and the theory of deciding to decide in: Lumer, 2005a; and some 
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A general view in decision psychology, accepted by the overwhelming majority of 
psychologists and economists doing empirical research in this field and a common 
feature of most empirical decision theories, is that deliberations roughly follow a 
decision theoretic framework: If people deliberate to form an intention they search 
for possible options; they consider the advantages and disadvantages of these 
options, i.e. they look for their possible non-neutral consequences (or more 
generally: the implications), the probability and desirability of these consequences; 
they value the options in the light of these advantages and disadvantages and, 
finally, choose the option with the highest value (overviews: Camerer, 1995, pp. 
617-674; Slovic et al., 1988). This means that the kind of information deciders seek 
during deliberation and the way they integrate them aims at providing an answer to 
the question ‘which is the best action?’. Although usually they do not internally 
formulate an optimality judgment, what they have tried to find out and what the 
cognitive result of their deliberation is and in the moment of decision believed to be 
true is an optimality judgment: ‘A certain action a is optimum among the options 
considered’, where the action distinguished in this way is now intended. 
 
H1 Intentions as optimality beliefs: Intentions are optimality beliefs that a 
certain action (on the basis of the subject's present data) is optimum 
(in a sense to be specified) among the options considered. 
 
Hypothesis H1 is not intended to mean that when people have these optimality 
beliefs that they think they have found the really best action but only that on the 
basis of their present information a is the best action. Hence, the optimality belief 
hypothesis (H1) does not imply that subjects believe that by continuing their 
deliberation or by obtaining new information they could not find a better option or 
could not find out that another of the considered options really is the best action. 
No, the optimality belief is only relative to the decider's present information. 
‘Optimum’ is the same as: highest desirability. So what does ‘desirability’ 
mean? The desirability referred to in H1 is the personal desirability, more precisely 
the personal desirability of the respective subject. A more technical version of this 
notion is also relative to a data base, e.g. the subject’s own data base at the moment 
of decision. So, the correct notion is: ‘the personal desirability of object a for subject 
s on the data base d’, which refers to or stands for a quantity. Since the following 
deals with personal desirability only, not e.g. with moral or social desirability, the 
addition ‘personal’ will sometimes be omitted. There are several concepts of 
personal desirability; the concept meant in H1 is ‘personal prospect desirability’. 
Prospect desirability is a summarising or aggregating desirability, which under 
conditions of incomplete information integrates all known desirability aspects of the 
value object into one quantity. These other desirability aspects are (i) the personal 
intrinsic desirability of the value object itself, i.e. the desirability it has as such – if it 
has any – independent of its consequences or other implications, and (ii) the 
personal intrinsic or personal prospect desirabilities of its various (and relevant) 
                                                                                                                                                                     
major parts of it have been summarised in: Lumer, 2007. 
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possible consequences or implications. 
During deliberation about executive actions subjects use decision strategies 
implying many secondary criteria of the aggregating desirability and optimality of 
alternatives. But there seems to be one primary, i.e. fundamental and most exact, 
criterion of the desirability and optimality of alternatives with which the quality of 
the secondary criteria can be measured. 
This is what hypothesis H2 says: 
 
H2 Primary and secondary desirability: Humans use a wide variety of 
decision modes implying different criteria of the aggregative 
desirability and optimality of options. These modes are not inborn but 
developed through cognitive processes, and their use in different 
situations is evaluated and chosen according to reflexively optimising 
deliberations that presuppose a primary or fundamental criterion of 
aggregative desirability and optimality. 
 
Even primary desirability criteria are not anthropologically fixed. There 
seem to be only anthropologically fixed adequacy criteria by which people can 
comparatively assess different desirability criteria as being more or less apt. This is 
said in my hypothesis H3: 
 
H3 Adequacy conditions for primary aggregative desirability concepts: If 
humans choose between fundamental concepts (D1, D2, ..., Dn) of 
aggregative desirability and they believe that among them D1 comes 
closest to fulfilling the following adequacy conditions whereas the 
others do not, they adopt D1 for their fundamental decisions. (The 
conditions for decisions under certainty are left out here.) 
 Condition for ‘prospect desirability’ for decisions without certainty: An 
adequate desirability criterion D1 is materially equivalent (i.e. on the 
basis of the same information it leads to the same preferences) to that 
desirability criterion Dx for which holds: if one disregards decision 
costs, the constant use of Dx as the criterion for decisions without 
certainty is totally optimum (i.e. optimum according to the criterion of 
‘total desirability’). (Cf. Lumer, 2005a, 252.) 
 
This means the long-term use of an adequate concept of prospect desirability 
in decisions under risk leads to maximising one’s total desirability. 
With respect to intrinsic desirability criteria here only a hint can be given:4 
Only one of the various desirability criteria used fulfils the adequacy conditions. 
This is a special form of hedonistic desirability criterion, namely a corrected form of 
hedonism, which in case of a manipulative origin of positive feelings discounts their 
value according to the degree of manipulation. 
 
                                                        
4 For a more extensive elaboration, on which the following sketch relies see: Lumer, 2009, pp. 191-
218; 428-521; on feeling induced intrinsic desires see also: Lumer, 2012. 
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5. THE PRACTICAL JUSTIFICATORY THESIS 
 
After having collected the necessary empirical information we are now able to 
determine the justificatory thesis for actions. The first empirical hypothesis (H1), 
that intentions are optimality beliefs, leaves no choice if we want to fulfil the first 
two adequacy conditions. 
 
JTA Justificatory thesis for actions: The justificatory thesis for prudential 
justifications of an action a of a subject s is: ‘a is the best option for s’. 
More precisely, there are two levels of prudential justifications of 
actions with slightly different justificatory theses. 
 1. Internal justification: ‘On the data base d (and with a relevance 
threshold r), action a among the considered set of options has the 
highest prospect (or total) desirability for subject s’, where d is the 
subject's data base at the moment of choice, and the threshold value r 
is appropriate to the choice situation, i.e. fitting to the desirability of 
the considered options and reasonable with respect to deliberation 
costs. 
 2. External justification: ‘On the data base d (and with a relevance 
threshold r), action a among all available options has the highest 
prospect (or total) desirability for s’, where d is the data base of an 
external instance, e.g. another subject, an expert or the set of all 
truths, and the threshold value r is fitting to the desirability of the 
considered options. 
 
The threshold value r has been introduced here as a further variable in the 
justificatory theses in the light of the possibility and practical importance of 
differently precise valuations (see the discussion of H2). That ‘the relevance 
threshold is r’ means that all the consequences or implications of the value object(s) 
which have a higher (absolute) prospect desirability than r (and which are 
cognisable on the data base d) are included in the calculation of the prospect 
desirability of the value object a. Lowering the relevance threshold means to aspire 
to more precise valuations. Increasing the relevance threshold may be adequate e.g. 
when a decision has to be taken urgently. 
The difference between an internal and an external justification reflects the 
difference between perspectives when an agent has to decide in a given situation 
with the cognitive means at hand or when an external entity – which also can be the 
agent herself in a second moment – considers which action is the really best, i.e. best 
if the agent's cognitive limitations are eliminated. Actually there are many external 
perspectives covering a range between full information and the data base of a 
specific person different from s. The external entity should consider all available 
(and relevant) options, whereas the subject can compare only those options which 
she has considered. However, one of the options of a rational subject is always to 
continue deliberation, thereby increasing the preciseness of her valuations or also, 
possibly, searching for new options and thus expanding the set of considered 
options. 
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The justificatory theses speak of  ‘prospect …’ and of ‘total desirability’. Of 
course, total desirabilities shall be calculated in case of decisions under certainty, 
and prospect desirabilities in other cases. In the following, however, we can treat 
total desirabilities as a limiting case of prospect desirabilities where all probabilities 
of the possible consequences are equal to 1. 
 
6. DEFINING ‘PERSONAL DESIRABILITY’ 
 
Now, the concept of ‘prospect desirability’ has to be defined. Here only two of the 
final definitions can be provided, which, of course, are based on the empirical 
hypotheses, in particular H3, and which try to contribute to fulfilling the adequacy 
conditions.5 
Hypothesis H3 dealt with aggregating desirabilities of an event's 
consequences to the prospect desirability of that event in situations without 
certainty, in particular when only the consequences' probabilities are known. For 
such situations rational decision theory proposes to weigh the consequences' 
desirabilities linearly, i.e. with their probability. However, this is not the only 
possibility of probability weighting and perhaps not always the best, in particular it 
may be not the best e.g. for rare types of decision, when the law of large numbers 
does not hold. For such situations decision strategies more risk-averse than linear 
probability weighting have been proposed. However, this discussion is beyond the 
scope of this paper and hence no theory of rational probability weighting will be 
developed here. Therefore, in the following this problem will be left open and only 
an undefined weighting function Πx,α 6 – where x is the probability value and α 
another situational factor, e.g. frequency of such a decision situation, from which the 
probability weight may also depend – will be inserted in the formalism. This does 
not entirely prevent the application of the theory presented here because in most 
cases the weighting will follow the identity function, so that the weight will be 
simply the probability itself. 
 
UPR Definition of ‘(exact) prospect desirability’:  
 
 The ‘prospect desirability of event e for the subject s on the data base 
d’ is defined as e's intrinsic desirability (for s) plus the sum of the 
intrinsic desirabilities (for s) of all intrinsically non-neutral 
consequences of e weighted by their probability weight. – In a 
somewhat more formal way this can be reformulated as:  
 Let ‘Upre,s,d’ be the functional notion ‘the prospect desirability of the 
event e for subject s on the data base d’, ‘Uinc,s’ the functional notion 
‘the intrinsic desirability of c for the subject s on the data base d’; in 
                                                        
5 The following definitions rely on and are much more elaborated in: Lumer, 2009, pp. 350-427. An 
English exposition of some of its critical ideas is: Lumer, 1998. 
6 I use a (mostly) bracket free writing style, where general terms are designated by upper-case letters 
and singular terms by lower-case letters which follow the general term. Hence the formula “Πx,α” 
used here, in most other texts is written as: “Π(x,α)”. 
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addition, let {c1, …, cn} be the set of the intrinsically non-neutral 
possible consequences of the event e, and p1, …, pn the respective 
probabilities on the data base d that the c1, …, cn accompany e.  
 Then the ‘propect desirability’ is defined as:  
 Upre,s,d  :=  Uine,s + ∑i Uinci,s ∙ П(pi,α). 
 
If the probabilities (on the data base d) with which the intrinsically non-
neutral consequences accompany e are all equal to 1, then we obtain the total 
desirability of e for s. 
Since, as has been noted above, in most cases it is impossible to list all 
intrinsically non-neutral consequences of an event, people summarise the utilities of 
the ramifications of some branch of intrinsically non-neutral consequences into the 
prospect desirability of the entire branch, where this prospect desirability is only 
estimated. The rational foundation of this procedure is the fact that in this way all 
the intrinsically non-neutral consequences of e are still considered, they are only 
grouped into non-overlapping subsets, namely in each case the intrinsically non-
neutral consequences of e which are consequences of the same intermediate 
consequence of e. 
Hypothesis H2 said that humans use a variety of secondary, in part much 
easier but less exact, desirability concepts which rely on an idea of the primary 
desirability concept; this is done to be able to adjust decision costs to the respective 
situation. The just-developed definition of ‘(exact) prospect desirability’ is a primary 
desirability concept. To make the conception applicable in the real world, we still 
need secondary desirability criteria, which fulfil the flexibility requirements. My 
proposal in this respect is to introduce a kind of flexible “rounding” into the 
calculation of prospect desirability. We proceed on the already chosen path, i.e. to 
group intrinsically non-neutral consequences via intermediate consequences and 
their prospect desirabilities. The next step is to introduce relevance threshold 
values such that only intermediate consequences whose prospect desirability 
exceeds this threshold are included in the desirability calculation of the main value 
object e. Because relevance thresholds can be chosen rather freely this leads to 
much flexibility in using the respective concept of ‘rounded prospect desirability’. Of 
course, rounded prospect desirability is less precise than exact prospect 
desirability; however the gain via accelerating deliberation may still be higher than 
the loss via reduced precision. Everyday deliberation uses still another main way to 
simplify decision, namely reduction, that is disregarding those consequences which 
two options have in common. Of course, this does not change the resulting 
preference. I will not elaborate further on this second possibility; reduction is a 
question of skill. Rounding and reduction probably cover the great majority of the 
rationally justifiable simplifications used in desirability calculation in everyday 
deliberation. 
On the basis of these considerations the functional notion ‘rounded prospect 
desirability’ can easily be defined. 
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URPR Definition of ‘rounded prospect desirability’: 
 
 The ‘rounded prospect desirability of event e for the subject s on the 
data base d with the relevance threshold r’ is defined as e's intrinsic 
desirability (for s) plus the sum of the (exact) prospect desirabilities 
(for s) of all consequences of e which reach the relevance threshold r 
weighted by their probability weight. – The somewhat more formal 
definition is this: 
 Let {c1, …, cn} be a set of relevant consequences of the event e (i.e. for 
all ci holds: |pi∙ Uprci | ≥ r), and p1, …, pn the respective probabilities on 
the data base d that the c1, …, cn accompany e; let ‘Urpre,s,r,d’ be the 
functional notion ‘the rounded prospect desirability of the event e for 
subject s on the data base d and with a relevance threshold r’ and the 
other notions be defined as before. Then the ‘rounded prospect 
desirability’ is defined as: 
 Urpre,s,r,d  :=  Uine,s + ∑i Uprci,s,d ∙ П(pi,α). 
 
The flexibility of this concept can be seen from the fact that in the most 
simple deliberations the relevance threshold can be raised so much that of all 
considered options (which may be only two: doing a or nothing (a0)) only one 
consequence is relevant; on the other extreme the threshold can be lowered and 
thereby the precision increased so much that the rounded prospect desirability 
captures nearly all intrinsically non-neutral consequences of the value object e and 
its value approaches the exact prospect desirability of e. 
The final step for concluding the definition of personal value judgments is the 
determination of the intrinsic desirability function. Finding the empirical bases and 
elaborating the definition and then the rational intrinsic desirability function itself is 
a demanding enterprise – just think of the measurement problems – beyond the 
scope of this paper.7 However, the result of an extensive discussion of this question 
has already been summarised above (end of sect. 4): namely, that only corrected 
hedonistic desirability functions can lead to fulfilling all the adequacy conditions for 
a practical justificatory thesis. Consequently, the intrinsic desirability presupposed 
in the definitions of ‘prospect desirability’ should be taken to be the corrected 
hedonistic desirability function.  
 
7. PRACTICAL ARGUMENTS FOR PERSONAL VALUE JUDGMENTS 8 
 
Having defined the necessary desirability concepts we can now establish what 
practical arguments are, or more precisely, provide validity and adequacy 
conditions for practical arguments for actions and personal desirability judgments. 
Above, the thesis for internal practical justifications of actions has been identified 
                                                        
7 My own proposal for solving this task, including a respective measurement theory, is elaborated in: 
Lumer, 2009, pp. 428-548. 
8 The following criteria are based on more extensive elaboration in: Lumer, 1990, pp. 319-366. 
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as: ‘On the data base d (and with a relevance threshold r), action a among the 
considered set of options has the highest prospect or total desirability for subject s.’ 
The direct arguments for such theses are impure molecular arguments (Lumer, 
2011, pp. 8-9; 16-19), i.e. arguments composed of several arguments of different 
types. At the supreme level there is a deductive argument, which infers from various 
premises of the form ‘On the data base d, the prospect desirability of action ai for 
subject s is ui’ and one premise that options a1 to an have been considered, that 
option a1 has the highest prospect desirability for s (cf. Feldman, 1999, pp. 351-354; 
420). This argument is trivial and can be neglected here. The interesting and much 
more complex arguments are the subordinated practical arguments in favour of the 
various desirability premises (elementary exposition, e.g.: Bowell & Kemp, 2010, pp. 
150-153). So these arguments will be dealt with in the following. They make up the 
elementary form of practical arguments. Such elementary practical arguments for 
personal desirability judgments can then be used in many other forms of molecular 
practical arguments like practical justifications of other non-propositional objects 
(instruments, proposals, rules etc.), justifications of moral or economic welfare 
judgments, arguments for empirical theories etc. (Lumer, 2011, pp. 24-26). 
For the epistemological approach to argumentation it is crucial that good 
arguments relate to (primary or secondary) truth criteria for the respective claim. 
More precisely, the way good arguments function is that they string judgments (the 
argument's reasons) in which some sufficient truth conditions for the thesis are 
judged to be fulfilled. When the addressee follows the listing of these judgments he 
then can assess step by step whether, according to his knowledge, all truth 
conditions for the thesis are fulfilled. The primary truth criteria for personal 
desirability judgments are, of course, the respective ‘desirability’ definitions, hence, 
in our theory, the desirability definitions of the last section. 
Following these lines and the paradigms of epistemological definitions of 
other kinds of arguments (Lumer, 1990; some synthesis: Lumer, 2005c) ‘valid 
practical argument’ can be defined as follows (cf. Lumer, 1990, pp. 319-366) – here 
‘argumentative validity’ comprises what is usually separated as ‘validity’ and 
‘soundness’; argumentative validity implies the truth or acceptability of the thesis. 
The definition covers only the (simple) case of the linear weighting function, so that 
probability values can immediately be used as the respective weights.  
 
PA Definition of ‘ideal valid (differentiating) practical argument’ (for 
personal desirability judgments): 
 x is an ideal valid (differentiating) practical argument iff 
 
PA0 Domain of definition: x is a triple r°,i,t, consisting of 
 1. a set r° of judgments r1, r2, ..., rm,  
 2. an indicator i of argument, and 
 3. a judgement t;  
 r1, ..., rm (the elements of r°) are called the ‘reasons for t’ and t is called 
‘the thesis of x’. 
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PA1 Form of the ideal (differentiating) practical argument: 
 1. Form of the thesis: The thesis t has (in the most ideal case) the form: 
‘On the data base d the (rounded prospect) desirability of event e for 
subject s with the relevance threshold r is u.’ (This is the most 
complicated form of the thesis; simpler forms of such a thesis and 
hence formally simpler arguments can be obtained by omitting the 
reference to a relevance threshold, i.e. by providing an argument for 
the exact prospect desirability of e, or, when all non-neutral 
consequences of e are known with certainty, by arguing for a total 
desirability value (instead of prospect desirability) of e.) 
 2. Forms of the reasons: 
 2.1. There are n judgments of the form: ‘On the data base d the 
probability that the consequence ci accompanies (in particular: is 
caused or symbolically or legally implied by) e is pi.’, with 0<pi≤1. 
 2.2. For all judgments of the first form there is an associated judgment 
of the form: ‘On the data base d the (exact) prospect or total 
desirability of the consequence ci for the subject s is ui.’ 
 2.3. There is one judgment of the form: ‘On the data base d, the 
consequences c1, …, cn are all the r-relevant consequences of e.’ (As 
has been explained in RPC5, this means roughly that for all these 
consequences ci (the absolute value of) the product of their 
probability pi and their exact prospect desirability ui (for s) reaches 
the relevance threshold r (|pi∙ui| ≥ r); and there are no further 
consequences of e reaching the relevance threshold r. 
 2.4. A further judgment states: ‘The intrinsic desirability of e for s is 
ue.’ 
 2.5. Finally, there is one judgment stating: ‘The sum of (e's intrinsic 
desirability) ue and of all the products of the relevant consequences' ci 
desirabilities ui and their respective probabilities pi is equal to u (ue + 
∑i ui∙pi = u).’ 
 2.6. Data base: All reasons mentioning a data base refer to the same 
data base d. 
 3. Indicator of argument: i indicates that x is an argument, that r1, r2, ..., 
rm are the reasons and that t is the thesis of x; in addition i can indicate 
the type of argument, i.e. that x is a practical (differentiating) 
argument. 
 
PA2 Argumentative validity: 1. guarantee of truth: 
 1. All reasons ri of the argument are true. 
 2. No consequence ci (see PA1.2.1) or its non-neutral consequences 
overlap (i.e. is identical with, part of or partially part of) with any 
other cj from c1, …, cn or its non-neutral consequences. And 
 
PA3 Argumentative validity: 2. Adequacy in principle: There is a person sx 
for whom d is the set of relevant data which can influence the 
evaluation of e. 
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 General definition of (possibly not ideal) ‘valid practical argument’ (for 
personal desirability judgments): 
 
PA4 Liberalisation: y is a valid (differentiating) practical argument iff: 
 0. Domain of definition: y is a triple q°,i,t', consisting of 
 0.1. a set q° of judgments q1, q2, ..., qk, 
 0.2. an indicator i of argument, and 
 0.3. a judgment t'; 
 1. Ideal version of y: There is an x (an ideal version of y) for which 
holds: 
 1.1. x is an ideal valid differentiating practical argument with the 
specifications given in PA0-PA3. 
 1.2. t' is identical to or a simplified form of t, specifying at least: ‘The 
desirability of e for subject s is u.’ 
 1.3. The reasons q° of y are a subset of (perhaps somewhat simplified 
versions of) the reasons r° of x which contains at least the reasons 
listing the consequences of e (reasons PA1.2.1) and, if e is not 
intrinsically neutral, the intrinsic valuation of e itself (reason PA1.2.3). 
And 
 2. Indicator of argument: i indicates that y is an argument, that q1, q2, 
..., qk are the reasons and that t' is the thesis of y; in addition i can 
indicate the type of argument. 
 
PA5 Situational adequacy: A valid (differentiating) practical argument with 
the characteristics just explained is adequate for rationally convincing 
an addressee h (hearer) of the thesis t (or t') iff: 
 1. Rationality of the addressee: The addressee h is linguistically 
competent, open-minded, attentive, discriminating. 
 2. Convincibility: The addressee h does not yet have a (valid) 
justification for the thesis t (or t' respectively), or he has only a 
justification that is weaker than the one presented in the argument. 
 3. Data base: dh, i.e. the addressee's data base, in its parts relevant for 
the argument, is identical to data base d underlying the argument or it 
is a subset of d. In the latter case and if the addressee's data base dh 
contains data incompatible with the argument's data base d, before an 
adequate use of the argument, the arguer and the addressee first have 
to exchange information and perhaps other arguments as well to 
equalise the data bases d and dh. 
 4. Knowledge about the consequences: The addressee h already 
justifiedly believes in the consequence listing reasons (reasons of type 
PA1.2.1) or he is able to recognise their acceptability immediately. 
(There is no prior knowledge requirement with respect to the 
completeness statement (PA1.2.3) because its truth, given the huge 
data bases we usually have available, cannot be positively recognised 
at all. We can only negatively find out perhaps that this statement is 
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not true. And there is no prior knowledge requirement regarding the 
calculation (PA1.2.5) because its truth can be recognised in actu.) 
 5. Knowledge about the valuations: The addressee h already believes in 
the desirability judgments about the consequences and about the 
value object e itself (PA1.2.2, PA1.2.4) or he is able to recognise these 
desirabilities in actu. (If this condition is not fulfilled a subordinate 
practical argument can be opened for fulfilling it.) 
 6. Relevance level: The relevance level r chosen in the argument is not 
more coarsely-grained than the level rationally desired by the 
addressee. 
 7. Practical function: In order to have a practical function, i.e. to make 
the addressee not only rationally believe in the thesis t but also make 
him adopt the valuation expressed in it as his own, the value subject s 
(referred to in the thesis t) has to be identical to addressee h or has to 
have – in the relevant respects – the same value function as addressee 
h. 
 
It may be helpful to highlight some elements of this definition. Conditions 
PA1-PA3 define ‘ideal valid practical arguments’ condition; PA4 releases these ideal 
conditions mainly by permitting to leave out various premises in an enthymematic 
fashion. Conditions PA1.2.1-2 require that there are pairs of reasons which in each 
case list some consequence of the value object and then assesses its prospect 
desirability. Condition PA1.2.5 instead speaks of the summarising statement in 
which all the consequences’ desirabilities and probabilities are aggregated to one 
overall desirability value. PA2.1 requires all the reasons of the argument to be true. 
An example for such an (ideal) practical argument is: ‘To cycle to the office is 
good physical exercise for me, it is eco-friendly, nearly as fast as going by car, and 
the probability of being caught in a rain today is marginal / 1%. According to my 
present information, these are all the relevant consequences of cycling to the office. 
These consequences, according to my preferences, are very good, good, satisfactory 
and marginally bad respectively which can be rated as 4 + 2 + 1 + (-2 · 0.01), 
which sums up to a relatively very, very high utility of 6.98. Therefore, cycling to 
the office according to my present information is very, very good for me has a 
rating of 6.98.’ Since the first three consequences, unlike the fourth, are certain 
there is no need to weight them by their probability. 
The adequacy condition PA5 is something like an instruction for use, or more 
precisely for the standard function of such arguments, namely convincing an 
addressee of the thesis – though definitely there are also other specific uses of 
arguments, e.g. systemising one's own deliberation or explaining one's motives to 
others. Practical arguments, unlike e.g. deductive arguments, do not leave much 
room for proving the thesis in different ways. The only real margin in this respect is 
to change the relevance threshold. If arguer and addressee have different data bases 
they have to arrange for making them identical in the relevant parts; if the 
addressee does not yet believe in some consequence statement or if he cannot 
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recognise the desirability of some consequence he first has to be convinced of it by a 
further argument. 
Differentiating practical arguments use the definition of ‘rounded prospect 
desirability’ and justify the value object's prospect desirability by reducing it to the 
prospect desirabilities of its consequences. Founding practical arguments go beyond 
this level and, based on the definition of ‘(exact) prospect desirability’, justify the 
value object's prospect desirability by reducing it to the intrinsic desirabilities of its 
consequences. Their structure is similar to the differentiating practical arguments; 
the main difference is that the consequences have to be valued intrinsically (cf. 
PA1.2.2). 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
With the definition of ‘valid practical argument’ and by providing conditions for 
their adequate use for rationally convincing, the development of good criteria for 
practical arguments has come to an end. Because of their psychological foundation, 
the so-defined arguments, or more precisely, the arguments for optimality 
judgments of which they are a part, fulfil the adequacy conditions for practical 
justifications of actions. Expressed somewhat differently: With this definition a 
valuable instrument has been designed for fulfilling several functions 
simultaneously. On the one hand, these arguments can be used to rationally 
convince the addressee of the thesis, which by the epistemological approach to 
argumentation is generally required of good arguments; on the other hand, belief in 
an optimality judgment about a future action, according to the sketched decision 
psychology, stably motivates a prudent agent to execute that action. 
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